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BANKS & BANKING-BILLS AND NOTES-FUNDS OF DEBTOR-FAILURE TO
APPLY-DIsCHARGE OF SURETY.-TATUm V. COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST
Co., 69 S. (ALA.) 5o.-Held, a bank holding notes indorsed to it by the
payee who was the principal debtor, of which it had knowledge, and
which failed to apply payee's deposit after maturity of notes to their pay-
ment, thereby discharges the accommodation maker.
It is universally held that a bank may apply the amount credited to a
depositor to a debt to it by such depositor, I Morse on Banks & Bank-
ing § 324. Decisions are conflicting as to whether the bank is duty bound
to do so for protection of indorser or surety. The prevailing rule seems
to be that a bank is not under obligations to appropriate a balance due to
the maker in payment of the liability of a surety. National Mahaiwe
Bank v. Peck, 127 Mass. 298; Citizen's Bank v. Booze, 75 Mo. App.
188. Another view treats the deposit as being security for the note and
so holds that bank's permitting depositor to withdraw this, effects a
discharge of the surety. Burgess v. Deposit Bank, 3o Ky. Law Rep. 177;
Commercial National Bank v. Henninger, 1O5 Pa. 496. But this usually
applies only where the deposit is to the credit of the pafty primarily
liable on the note. First National Bank v. Pelta, 176 Pa. 513. This doc-
trine is further restricted in some of these jurisdictions by holding that
failure of bank to appropriate funds placed there after maturity does
not discharge surety. National Bank of Newburgh v. Smith, 66 N. Y.
271. This restriction, however, is not logical. The lien theory adopted
by the principal case cannot be sustained because there is no property in
the hands of bank belonging to the debtor to which the surety on pay-
ing can be subrogated. It should be observed that the principal case
extends the security doctrine to protect the surety even where the deposi-
tor is an accommodated payee.
M. H. L.
BILLS AND NOTES-BONA FIDE PURCHASER-KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECTR.-
HARDIN ET AL. V. DALE ET AL., 146 PAC. (OIL.) 717.-A corporation, the
payee of a note, had been notified that the consideration for which it
was given had failed. Thereafter, before maturity and for value, the cor-
poration transferred the note to one of its directors who had no actual
knowledge of the fact. Held, the director was chargeable with notice
and was not a purchaser in 
good faith.
In general, a corporation has imputed knowledge of all matters brought
to the notice of its directors and officials. Mutual Investment Co. v. Wild-
man, 182 Ill. App. 137; Arthur v. Harrington, 211 Fed. 215. The con-
verse of this doctrine, as regards banks, is thus laid down: "Whatever
knowledge a director has or ought to have officially, he has or will be
conclusively presumed to have as a private individual." Morse, Banks
& Banking, § 137. See also State Bank of Indiana v. Mentzler, 125 Iowa
oi; McKarty v. Kepreta, 139 N. W. (N. D.) 992 (Spalding, C. I., and
Bruce, J., dissenting). A person will be held to have notice as an indi-
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vidual of what he does as agent of a corporation. Lancaster v. Collins,
7 Fed. 338; Boit & McKenzie v. Whitehead, 50 Ga. 76. In some juris-
dictions an agent of an industrial corporation is chargeable with notice
of equities against commercial paper, where the corporation as payee
or indorsee had actual notice. Mason v. Jones, 7 D. C. 247; Webb v.
Moseley, 70 S. W. (Tex.) 349. This coincides with the doctrine of the
principal case, but in a few states such .facts are merely evidence of
bad faith to go to the jury. Phillips v. Loyd, 83 Ga. 536; Martin v. John-
stot, 134 Neb. 797.
S. H. S.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERs-BREAcH OF CONTRAcT-DAMAGS-
HumILIATiON.-FREEMAN V. CLARK, 177 S. W. (TEx.) ii88.-When plain-
tiff, contemplating attending a Confederate Reunion, was induced by the
traffic agent of defendant railroad to travel over its lines, and to influence
his friends to do so, by the promise to furnish through first-class chair-
car transportation, held, in an actiofi for breach of such contract, the
plaintiff could not recover for any humiliation he sustained because the
friends whom he had induced to go with him were compelled to ride in
inferior cars.
The following is the generally accepted rule of damages for breach of
contract: The damages recoverable for breach of contract are those
which might reasonably have been contemplated by the parties. Hadley
v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. Mental suffering, resulting from breach of
contract, has been held not to be a subject for compensation. Russell v.
Western Union T. Co., 3 Dakota 315; Beaulien v. Great Northern Ry.,
1O3 Minn. 47; Sedgwick on Damages, Vol. I, p. 65. If, however, mental
anguish is such a necessary and natural result of the breach of contract
as that the party breaking it can be held t6 have contemplated such
mental suffering, a recovery may be allowed. K. and T. Ry. Co. of Texas
v. Ball, 61 S. W. (Tex.) 327. Where a carrier compelled a white woman
to ride in a negro coach, it violated its contract, and for such breach is
liable for the mental pain and humiliation suffered as the direct result
of the breach, though unaccompanied by physical injury. See also Cole
v. Gray, 70 Kan. 705. These cases serve as precedents for the view of
the principal case upon this point at page i89. There has been much
confusion as to the test to be adopted in determining whether to allow
recovery for mental anguish, distress and humiliation. The true test
seems to be: "Where other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for,
other than pecuniary standards will be applied in th ascertainment of
damages flowing from the breach." Wadsworth v. Western U. T. Co.,
86 Tenn. 695. This test is borne out by the case of Lewis v. Hohnes,
iop La. 1O3O, where a breach of a contract to furnish a trousseau for a
bride was held naturally to involve mental suffering. See also Smith
v. Leo, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 242. If one of the contracting parties receive
special notice of circumstances that make mental suffering a natural con-
sequence of the breach, recovery may be hAd. Thus, "Undertakers, who
contract with parents to keep safely the body of their deceased child
until they should be ready to inter the same, are liable, on breach of such
contract, in damages for mental anguish caused thereby." Reinhan v.
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Wright, 125 Ind. 536. In the principal case, the carrier cannot be said to
have had notice that mental suffering would follow a breach.
C. Y. B.
CHARITIES-CHARITAB3LE CORPORATION-VOLUNTEER FIE DEPARTMENT.-
NEPTUNE FIRE ENGINE & HOSE Co. v. BOARD OF EDucATION.-I78 S. W.
(Ky.) I38-Held, a volunteer fire department which received a remu-
neration from the city for its services, and which was incorporated under
an act that did not definitely impose upon it the duty of going to all
fires, is not a charitable corporation.
After the Statute of 43 Eliz. those purposes were considered chari-
table in England which "that statute enumerates, or which by analogies
are deemed within its spirit and intendment." Morrice v. Bishop of Dur-
ham, 9 Ves. 399. A Ky. statute concerning charities, after an enumera-
tion of purposes not including volunteer fire departments, concludes, "or
all grants, conveyances, etc., for any other charitable or humane purpose
shall be valid if it shall point out with reasonable certainty the purposes
of the charity. . . ." Ky. Statutes 19o9. Chapter Y7. The character
of an institution as a public charity is not effected by this fact alone,
that a fee is accepted or required from those benefited.. Centennial &
Memorial Association of Valley Forge, 235 Pa. 206; New Eng. Sani-
tarnit v. Stoneham, 2o5 Mass. 333; Commonwealth v. Y. M. C. A., 116
Ky. 711 (Burnam, C. J., dissenting). Gifts for fire protection have been
held to be for a charitable purpose. Magil v. Brown, 16 Fed. Cases 408;
Bethlehem Borough v. Perseverance Fire Co., 81 Pa. 445. But fire com-
panies organized and supported by insurance companies have been held
not to be charitable corporations. Bates v. Worcester Protective Dept.,
177 Mass. 130; Louisville Ry. Co. v. Louisville Fire & Life Protective
Assn., 151 Ky. 644. Contra, Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624.
In the principal case, no positive duty is imposed upon the corporation
to go to fires, and it does not appear that the remuneration was for
upkeep alone, and not for profit. It was therefore rightly held not to be
a public charity.
S. H. S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-I4TH AmENDMENT-POLICE POWERS-SEGREGA-
TION ORDINANCES.-HOPKINS v. CITY OF RIcHMOND, COLEMAN v. TowN OF
ASHLAND, 86 S. E. (VA.) i39.-Held, ordinances which provided for
the segregation of races in the city of Richmond and the town of Ash-
land, and which contained clauses providing that nothing therein should
affect the location of residences made previous to the approval of the
ordinances, were valid. See XXV Yale Law Journal 81.
CONTRACTS-MUTUALITY-CoNTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT.-GABRIEL V.
OPOZNAUER, 153 N. Y. Sur. 99o.-Held, a contract of hiring is not void for
want of mutuality where plaintiff entered into performance of her duties
and would have completed, but for defendants' breach, because it did
not contain any words expressly requiring plaintiff to perform; it appear-
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ing that the contract was one for services for a year and that defend-
ants specified the grounds for discharge.
Contracts must be obligatory on both parties so that each may have an
action upon it, in order to be binding. McGozwin Lumber Co. v. Camp
Lumber Co., 68 So. (Ala.) 263. Defendant in the principal case claims
that inasmuch as the contract contained only an engagement of the plain-
tiff by the defendant for a year and no reciprocal agreement by the plain-
tiff to work for that time,. the contract was unilateral and could be
accepted only by a year's work. This reasoning is analogous to that of
the decision in Hudson v. Brozwning, 174 S. W. (Mo.) 393. It was there
held that a contract to take 20ooo0 railroad ties was void where the
seller was not bound to furnish that many. To meet this the court allows
evidence outside the contract to be introduced to the effect that both
parties considered the plaintiff bound to give her services for a year and
that so believing she began work. In accord with the principal case is
Halpern v. Langrock Co., 153 N. Y. S. 985. The case of Ayer Tie Co.
v. O'Bannon & Co., 174 S. W. (Ky.) 783, goes further in finding mutu-
ality. There the contract required the defendant to accept "such ties as
the plaintiff could deliver" within a certain time and it was held there
was no want of mutuality as plaintiff would be required to use reason-
able diligence in procuring and delivering the ties.
S. B.
QUASI-CONTRACT-PAYMENT UNDER Duass-FEAR OF INJURY TO BUSI-
NEss.-BALDwIN V. VILLAGE OF CHASANING, 154 N. W. (MICH.) 84.-In
order to prevent depreciation in the value of his property, plaintiff with-
out protest paid a license fee under an invalid ordinance. Held, there
was no duress, and the payment could not be recovered.
As a general proposition of law a tax paid voluntarily under an illegal
assessment cannot be recovered, if there was no coercion, but merely
ignorance of the law. Holder v. Galena, i Ill. App. 409; Painter v.
Polk, 81 Ia. 242; Garrison v. Tillinghast, I8 Cal. 404. So too, when an
excessive amount has been exacted. Camden v. Green, 54 N. J. L. 591;
Baker v. Bucklin, 6o N. Y. S. 294. A payment, to be regarded as made
under duress, thus making it involuntary, must be made to relieve the
person or property from an actual and existing duress imposed by the
party to whom the money is paid. Vick v. Shinn, 49 Ark. 70. The
authorities, however, are divided as to whether or not the payment of
an illegal license fee due to the exigencies of business is sufficient duress
to warrant recovery. One line holds to the view that business necessity
does not alter the voluntary character of the payment. Custin v. Viro-
qua, 67 Wis. 314; Robinson v. City Council, 2 Richardson Law (S. C.)
317. The other, considering that the parties are not in pari dilecto,
allows recovery. Baker v. Ciincinnati, ii Ohio St. 534; Swift v. U. S.,
II U. S. 29; Catoir v. Matterson, 38 Ohio St. 3ig. In view of the
authorities, one is led to form the conclusion that payment under cir-
cumstances similar to those of the principal case may be recovered, and




CONVEYANcE-HUSBAND AND WIFE-ESTATE By ENTIRETY.-IN RE
KLATZL, N. Y. LAW JOURNAL, OCT. 20, 1915 (COURT OF APrEALs).-Held,
land conveyed by a husband to himself and wife, although it is specified
that they are to be tenants by entirety, is held by them as tenants in
common. Collin, Hiscock, and Cardozo, JJ., dissenting.
The majority holds that the husband and wife here held as tenants in
common, because it is demonstrable that they are not joint tenants or
tenants by entirety, and hold undivided shares. (See Washburn on Real
Property, § 876.) The entire court agrees that they are not joint ten-
ants, for even if the conveyance is regarded as made to two persons,
by statute they do not hold as joint tenants, unless expressly so pro-
vided in the deed. The majority holds that they are not tenants by
entirety, for the basis of that estate is the common law unity of husband
and wife, and since statutes have so far destroyed that unity as to enable
a husband to convey to 'his wife, it does not exist in this respect, that it
may be the recipient of an estate from one of its parts. The minority
insists that mere implication will not uphold a destruction of the com-
mon law rule, and hence the statute which authorizes a conveyance
from husband to wife does not sunder the unity; so, there being a
valid conveyance to the unity, an estate by entirety is created. That the
conveyance was valid to create some estate in husband and .wife, the
court takes for granted. (But see, to the effect that an attempted con-
veyance from A to A and B vests the entire estate in B, Cameron v.
Steves, 9 New Brunswick 141; Shep. Touchstone 82.) The point
involved in this case appears to be novel.
C. Y. B.
COR0ATIONS-LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS-MISCONDUCT TOWARDS CORPORA-
TIoN.-GENRRAL RUBBER Co. v. BENEDICT, 109 N. E. (N. Y.) 96.-The
defendant; director of plaintiff corporation, failed to notify the plaintiff
that funds of another corporation, in which it held most of the stock,
were being misappropriated. Held, defendant was liable for breach of
duty as a director.
It is well recognized that the directors of a corporation are its agents.
Cu tpberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman et al., 30 Barb. 553. Ordinarily
an agent is bound to inform his principal of matters material to his
agency arising within the scope of his duties. Clark & Co. v. Bank of
Wheeling, 17 Pa. St. 322. And he is liable for failure to do so. Brown
v. Arrot, 6 W. & S. (Pa.) 402; Rogers v. Bradford, I Pin. (Wis.) 418.
A director is bound to exercise as much care, as a director, as men ordi-
narily exercise in their own affairs. Hui v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65. In some
states he is held to be in a position with reference to corporate property
analogous to that of a trustee. Ryan v. Leavenworth, 21 Kan. 365. The
principal case certainly goes as far as Hun v. Cary, supra, in holding a
director to strict accountability. The decision seems to extend the gen-
eral rule, which holds the agent only as to matters arising within the
scope of his agency.
L. S.
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FIRE INSURANCE-BREACH OF CONDITION-FORFEITURE-STATUTORY REGU-
LATIoN-REtROAcTIVE PoWER.-LAGDEN V. CONCORDIA MUT. FiRE INS. Co.
OF BAY, SAGINAW AND ARENAC COUNTIES, 154 N. W. (MIcH.) 87. In case
of a breach of condition in a policy requiring notice on taking out other
insurance, held, that under Pub. Acts, 1911, No. 128, providing that no
policy of fire insurance shall be void for breach of condition, if the
insurer has not been injured by such breach, and where loss has not
occurred by reason thereof, the insured is not precluded from recovering
despite the terms of the contract making the policy void for such breach.
Ostrander, J. dissents from the reasoning of the majority, and from the
conclusion on the added ground that the statute cannot be retroactive.
At common law, a breach of condition of an insurance policy resulted
ina forfeiture irrespective of its materiality. Bank of Ballston Spa v. Ins.
Co., 5o N. Y. 45; Norzvaysa v. Ins. Co., 204 Ill. 334. Sometimes, however,
forfeiture has been held to result only from a permanent breach. Adair
v. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. 297. A temporary breach by securing double insur-
ance did not cause forfeiture. Obenneyer v. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573. The
breach, it has been held, must be one of the operative factors at the time
of the loss if it is to be effective. 65 Ohio St. i19. Statutory regulation
of insurance contracts has been upheld. McGannon v. Ins. Co., 127 Mich.
639. When provisions clash, those of the policy yield to those of the
statute. Ritchey v. Home Ins. Co., 1O4 Mo. App. 146; Christian v. Ins.
Co., 143 Mo. 46o. (Statutes similar to that of the principal case are in
force in Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and
So. Dakota. Richards on Ins., 157.) Accordingly, in the regulation of
insurance contracts, the statute prevails and the general principle of law
as laid down in the principal case is sound. However, in its application
to the facts of the principal case, the query of Ostrander, J. (dissenting)
with regard to the retroactive effect of the statute of I1ip on this con-
tract made in i9o8 brings out clearly that the majority made an error.
A statute may limit the right of a corporation to contract, Ins. Co. v.
Craven, 178 U. S. 389; but it cannot impair the obligations of contracts
already made. Const. of U. S. Art. I, Sec. zo. This applies to insurance
contracts. Brit. Amer. Ass. Co. v. Ry., 52 Colo. 589; and to conditions
in contracts in general. Murray v. Charlestown, 96 U. S. 432.
J. McD.
INSURANcE-AcCIDENT INSURANCE--"ACcIDENT."--NEwsOME V. TRAVEL-
ERs INS. Co., 85 S. E. (GEo.) 035.-An accident insurance policy con-
tained a provision which excepted from operation of the policy injuries
"intentionally inflicted on insured by any other person." Held, such
exception does not relieve insurer from liability for an injury inflicted
on insured by a third person, who mistook the insured for the person
intended to be injured.
Where the issue is whether injury to the insured in an accident policy
was intentionally inflicted by a third party, the intention of the third
party is alone controlling. Travelers Prdtective Assn. v. Fawcett, 104
N. E. (Ind.) 991. This intention (i. e., of the third party) may be
resolved into the following elements: (I) Intent to commit the par-
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ticular injury. (2) Direction of the intent against some particular person.
Where it can be shown that both of these elements are lacking, the insur-
ance company will be unquestionably liable as for an accident. E. g.,
where the injury is by 'an insane person incapable of rational intent.
Corley v. Travelers Protective Assn. io5 Fed. 854, 46 C. C. A. 278;
Berger v. Pac. Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Fed. 24. A person may become equally
incapable by intoxication. Northwestern Benevolent Soc. v. Dudley, 61
N. E. 207, 27 Ind. App. 327. Conversely, if both of these elements of
intent are present, the insurance company will not be held liable. Butero
v. Travelers Accid. Ins . Co., 71 N. W. 811, 96 Wis. 536. A difficulty
arises when the court tries to make one element sufficient without the
other. Under a policy providing for non-liability when death is caused
by an intentional injury by the insured or others, recovery cannot be
had when the insured was murdered. Travelers Prot. Ass'n. of America
v. Langholz, 86 Fed. 60, 29 C. C. A. 628; Johnson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
39 S. W. 972, is Tex. Civ. App. 314. The general intent to commit
murder is here held sufficient, although intent against the particular
person may or may not have been present. Again, the case of Conti-
nental Casualty Co. v. Cunningham, 66 So. (Ala.) 41, in holding that
physical injury by a third party, who understood the nature and conse-
quences of his act, was an intentional act within the policy, seems to
imply, as in the murder case, that general intent to injure is alone
sufficient to preclude recovery.
If so, the authority of Johnson v. Co., supra, is opposed to that of the
principal case, which holds that although the first element was present,
in the absence of the second element-namely, the intent against the
particular person (i. e., the insured)-the act is still to be regarded as
accidental and the company is liable. C. B.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AGENT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES--IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF AUTHORITY-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-GRISWOLD v. HAAs, 177
S. W. (Mo.) 728.-Where defendant bid in some bonds at a commission-
er's sale as agent, but was in fact without authority, in an action of
assumpsit for breach of his implied warranty of authority, held, the
measure of damages was the amount of the-bid.
In some states the measure of damages in a similar action is the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market price. LeRoy v. Jacobov-
sky, 136 N. C. 443; Roberts v. Tuttle, 105 Pac. (Wash.) 516. In others,
damages recoverable are all those directly caused by the want of authority.
Simmons v. Moore, ioo N. Y. 14o; Hyman v. Caspary, 117 N. Y. Supp.
966. And this is held to include the costs of an unsuccessful action against
the supposed principal. White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117; Groeltz v. Arm-
strong, 125 Iowa 39; see Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. lO8. But the
plaintiff cannot recover what he would have made had the principal per-
formed. Wallace v. Bentley, 77 Cal. ig; Teddler v. Riggin, 61 So. (Fla.)
244.
The weight of authority seems to be contrary to the principal case, in
which, though suit is brought for breach of an implied warranty of
authority, the agent is really forced to perform a contract of purchase.
L. S.
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RAILROADS-KILLING DOG AT CROSSING-QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE.-
TAYLOR V. ST. Louis R. R., i7i S. W. (ARK.) ii8z.-Held, proof that
plaintiff's dog was killed by defendant's train at a crossing establishes
a prima facie case of negligence on part of the railroad company.
In some states a duty is placed upon railroad companies to fence in
their rights of way, but even in states where this is not required the mere
killing of an animal on the railroad track is by a large number of decisions
held to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the railroad.
Ritter v. R. R., 83 S. C. 21, 65 S. E. 175; Kansas City, So. R. R. v.
Cash, 8o Ark. 284, 96 S. W. io62; Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R. v.
Burgess, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 252. In support of the theory that owners of
animals, where the railroad is not required to fence out, must assume the
major portion of the risk, many cases hold that there is no presump-
tion that there was negligence from the mere fact of the killing. St.
Louis & S. W. R. R. v. Conley, 142 S. W. (Tex.) 36; Cox v. Chicago
N. W. R. R., 126 N. W. (Neb.) 999; Stark v. C. B. & Q. R. R., iS N. W.
(Neb.) io66. If any distinction is to be made between different kinds of
animals, it would seem proper in the case of dogs or similar animals that
the rule should be construed more liberall in favor of the railroad,
because they are not to be fenced in or out and act more on their own
initiative than in the case of cattle. In line with this reasoning a recent
holding or this specific point is to the effect that there is no presumption
of negligence on the part of the railroad from the mere fact of the kill-
ing of the dog upon its tracks. Fowles v. S. A. L. R. R., 73 S. C. 306,
53 S. E. 534. This is directly opposed to the principal case.
C. B.
SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLEs-LIABILITY ON OFFICIAL BoND-HomIilDE.
ROBERTSON V. SMITH, 85 S. E. (GA.) 988.-Held, a homicide committed
by a deputy sheriff while investigating a crime, but not in the perform-
ance of any official duty, or upon one having any connection with the
crime, is not such official misconduct as will subject the sheriff and his
sureties to a suit upon his bond. Russell, J., dissenting.
In general, only those acts of a sheriff under color of office which are
an abuse of authority and not a usurpation of authority never granted
to him, render his sureties liable on his bond. State ex rel. Brennan v.
Dierker, IOI Mo. 636. E.g., as to abuse of authority: The wrongful
shooting of a misdemeanant for whom the constable has a warrant of
arrest. Black v. Moore, 8o S. W. (Tex.) 867; State v. Cunningham, 65
So. (Miss.) 115; Johnson v. Williams Adm'r., 23 Kv. Law Rep. 658
(wrongful arrest). As to usurpation of auth.: Assault on one not a
party to the writ of ft. fa. which constable is engaged in serving. State
v. Dayton, 61 Atl. (Md.) 624. The dividing line between abuse of author-
ity and individual tort for which not even color of office may be inferred,
is indistinctly drawn. Inasmuch as no act save that specifically contem-
plated in his writ of authority-e. g., arresting B instead of A-cal be
said to be an act for' which he was empowered, the attempt to separate
these two classes must necessarily be arbitrary and not natural. This
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arbitrary attempt is based on the theory of colore ofllci the presence or
absence of which is the test of the sureties' liability.
Dissenting Judge Russell holds that since Norton in the principal case
was on a journey of official business, and was clothed with the powers of
a deputy sheriff, in which capacity he committed the homicide, however
unjustifiably, he acted under color of office.
The essential criterion discernible in this and other decisions seems to
be whether the intent of the party was to do the act as an official or
as a private citizen.
S. B.
